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ESTOPPEL, AND THE BALANCE
OF TRUST
James T. O'Reilly*
This study of small business regulation suggests that Congress
should require agencies to offer explanatory advice about agency re-
quirements via the Internet, and that the advice should have an estoppel
effect to enable reliance by its users. By expanding upon themes from
recent legislation and proposed bills, Congress could speed the shift to
more rapid and effective advice. This may help to resolve the constant
complaints by smaller businesses about the regulatory burdens imposed
by the federal system.
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INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurs and government regulators see the world quite differ-
ently. Economic progress is a function of growth largely driven by en-
trepreneurial initiatives. Flexibility and risk are essential components of
entrepreneurial success. Yet these traits are also antithetical to what bu-
reaucrats deem necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of federal
regulatory machinery because uniformity in handling regulated compa-
nies or persons is deemed essential. The economic literature analyzing
success among entrepreneurs emphasizes a degree of risk tolerance that
would be abhorrent to a career bureaucrat.' Entrepreneurs and govern-
ment regulators also view systems of recognition and rewards quite dif-
ferently. The reward of being a risk-taking entrepreneur is that one can
achieve short-term payouts and possibly capture market share for the
longer term against the slower and more cautious competitors, whereas
bureaucrats view stability, lack of risk, and long-term predictable out-
comes as rewarding.
I Joshua Ronen, Some Insights into the Entrepreneurial Process, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP
137, 148 (Joshua Ronen ed., 1983).
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This article argues (1) agencies charged with regulating the risks
taken by innovator-entrepreneurs should seek specific improvements in
their Internet-based responsiveness to the informational guidance needs
of those innovators; (2) innovator-entrepreneurs should be granted a lim-
ited legal entitlement to rely upon advice received from administrative
agencies; and (3) two-way interactive dialogue is the optimal response to
the climate of alienation and antipathy that currently seems to exist be-
tween regulators and innovator-entrepreneurs. 2 While there are costs to
providing these extra services to innovator-entrepreneurs, society will
benefit from the expanded economic growth that will ensue once innova-
tor-entrepreneurs are free to develop useful and original new products in
a regulatory atmosphere that encourages the efficient dissemination of
the information needed to remain in compliance with administrative
health and safety standards. In short, building trust between government
regulators and innovator-entrepreneurs is worth the investment.
Some entrepreneurs are active business innovators who seek to cap-
italize on risky opportunities in pursuit of profits from production or
trade.3 This article will focus on this subset of entrepreneurs who are
also innovators (as contrasted with those who distribute or sell an ex-
isting commodity more efficiently) because, as explained below, due to
the nature of the innovator's enterprise, the innovator-entrepreneur test-
ing a new product or idea is more likely to encounter regulatory barriers
than entrepreneurs engaged in more traditional methods of production or
trade.
One economist has defined the entrepreneurial innovator as "the
constant and dynamic innovator, who incessantly seeks new endeavors
that involve research and development, market testing, and other uncer-
tainty-reducing activities."4 The innovator's product idea, implanted in
the incubator of a small business, can grow to meet a societal or con-
sumer need. This growth flows from the entrepreneur's willingness to
take risks in pursuit of the profitable development of that idea. Innovator
risks differ from the conventional entrepreneurial risks of capital assets:
conventional entrepreneurial risks are internalized and could result in the
bankruptcy of one or more individuals, while innovator risks are often
2 See id. at 142 (suggesting that excessive regulation can discourage innovators from
pursuing their ideas).
3 For useful definitions see, e.g., Gary D. Libecap, Entrepreneurship, Property Rights
and Economic Development, in 6 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVA-
TION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 67, 69 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 1993); Albert N. Link, Entrepre-
neurship and External Sources of Technology, in 6 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra, at 177-78; Steven Hobbs,
Toward a Theorv of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 241, 282 (1997) (quoting
HOWARD H. STEVENSON ET AL., NEW BUSINESS VENTURES AND THE ENTREPRENEUR 16 (2d
ed. 1985)):.
,4 Ronen, supra note I, at 148.
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externalized to include users of the new product or those who depend on
the novel service the innovator provides. For example, an AIDS drug
developer might invest $500,000 in a clinical study that unfortunately
does not validate the drug's effectiveness; this is a conventional business
risk. Alternatively, an innovator-entrepreneur might externalize risk by
rushing into the sale of an unproven drug that she believes capable of
helping AIDS patients but that in fact worsens the health of the majority
of paying customers. For purposes of this article we will examine
predominantly social regulations of a safety and environmental nature, 5
which are often encountered by the innovator- entrepreneur, rather than
economic ratemaking and regulation, which are more widely applicable
to all business. 6
In developing new products or processes, the innovator-entrepre-
neur often risks potential collision with federal regulators such as the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"),7 Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA"),H Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion ("CPSC"),9 Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), " ' etc. The
government's role as "gatekeeper," tasked with controlling the safety of
products or service providers, is likely to conflict with the innovator's
"speed to market" ideal in which the innovator obtains a rapid return on
his or her investment by moving quickly from an identified market need
to a novel product or service that addresses that need.'' The ability to
5 The advice function discussed herein pertains to permits, approvals, or exceptions that
relate to safety, health, or environmental issues, rather than to the more conventional advice
regarding economic regulation such as the Department of Justice Antitrust Division's business
review letters. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1999).
6 While each is a form of government regulation, the innovator is likely to encounter the
safety and environmental regulators more frequently, especially through on-site inspections,
and this trend accelerates as economic regulation declines in deregulated markets such as air-
lines and telecommunications. Murray Weidenbaum, Improving the Public Polic, Climate fin
Midsize Business By Reforming Government, in 10 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1, 7-9 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 199X).
7 The FDA is the gatekeeper agency for pre-market approval of drugs, medical devices,
and other products. See 21 U.S.C. § 393 (1994).
8 The U.S. Department of Labor administers the process of safety standard-setting for
workplaces under the Occupational Health & Safety Act of 1970. See 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994).
9 CPSC regulates an immense variety of consumer products by requiring manufacturers
to self-report potential product defects. See 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1994).
I( EPA regulates the facilities of innovator-entrepreneurs in numerous ways including
through the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act's controls on hazardous waste generated
from manufacturing of products. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-39 (1994). However, this article
focuses on chemical product development prior to marketing, which is subject to exhaustive
regulatory controls under the Toxic Substances Control Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29
(1994). EPA also has specific product approval authorities under the Federal Insecticide Fun-
gicide & Rodenticide Act, and numerous other laws with which an innovator must comply as a
prerequisite to lawful market entry. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-36 (1994).
II Ronen, supra note 1, at 142 (Entrepreneurs are "in a hurry to gain the edge on their
possible imitators, launch new products, to carry out new factor combinations."). The FDA's
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quickly adjust to changing conditions is imperative to the innovator-en-
trepreneur's success; yet regulation reduces the entrepreneur's capacity
for rapid change.12 Further, through what some economists have called a
systematic manipulation of the regulatory system to constrain innovators,
larger companies in competition with the innovator-entrepreneur can use
long-settled agency relationships to place even further regulatory con-
straints on the innovator. 13 Improving the dialogue between regulators
and innovator-entrepreneurs would carry the major benefits of, first, im-
proving awareness of expectations on the other side; second, anticipating
problems that miscommunication can cause; and third, equalizing the
flow of specialized knowledge that presently is so favorable to the larger
businesses.
I. BARRIERS TO THE INNOVATOR-ENTREPRENEUR
A. FIVE MAIN BARRIERS TO ENTREPRENEURIAL DEVELOPMENT
At least five barriers confront every aspiring innovator-entrepre-
neur: information, capital, intellectual property, technical failure, and
regulatory constraints. After touching briefly on the first four, this article
will address the fifth issue at length.
I. The Infirmation Barrier
The innovator-entrepreneur faces an information deficit: How can I
best identify and exploit an opportunity? Is my idea for a product or
procedure feasible and technically supportable? The entrepreneur cures
this information deficit through experimentation, research, failure, and
modification, collectively known as the innovator's "sweat equity"' 14 in
the evolution of the concept into tangible form. But the regulatory re-
quirements of various administrative agencies can create their own infor-
mation deficits that cannot be altered with "sweat equity;" data
developed at the earliest stages must be assembled and recorded in the
precise format required by government regulators and "gatekeepers,"
historical controls on new drug products are derived from an innovator who erred in rushing a
new drug to the market in 1937 without recognizing that its liquid component was fatal if
swallowed by humans. See CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC
ACT 1316-27 (1938). The resulting tragedy, nearly 100 deaths from ingestion of the new
product, led to adoption of the 1938 Food Drug & Cosmetic Act's "new drug approval"
processes. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994); see also DUNN, supra.
12 See Ronen, supra note 1, at 142 (Entrepreneurs surveyed said they "might never have
ventured forth as entrepreneurs if governmental regulation had been excessive at the time.").
13 Cf. id. at 9.
14 Sweat equity refers to "hard work put into a house, business, etc. to increase its value."
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1352 (3d college ed. 1988); see also http://
www.sweatequity.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2001) (defining sweat equity as "unreimbursed
labor that increases the value of a property or is invested to establish a business or other
enterprise").
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such as patent examiners and drug reviewers. The law grants administra-
tive agencies great discretion to set uniform norms for both procedural
elements of the regulatory process (e.g., manner of information collec-
tion and submission), as well as substantive evaluation standards used to
assess an innovator's compliance with statutory and regulatory
requirements. 15
2. The Capital Barrier
The capital barrier prevents most innovator-entrepreneurs from
quickly shifting from a supportable idea to a scaled-up manufacturing
system that produces a saleable product. Capital flows in the direction of
probable success as a free market chooses which competitors to support.
The innovator must create value by demonstrating that the idea will at-
tract purchasers, and that the demand for his or her product justifies a
price that will both cover operating expenses and generate a positive cash
flow. A sound business plan and adequate financial support suffice to
overcome this barrier, at least initially. But government regulation im-
pacts the capital barrier as well by adding costs; the innovator's capital
might be drained off in a regulatory agency conflict that bankrupts the
smaller enterprise before sales and profits can be achieved.' 6
3. The Intellectual Property Barrier
Preserving intellectual property presents the innovator with a third
potential barrier to success. Often, the entrepreneur's idea is developed
with a trade secret or know-how that will ripen into a patent filing in the
future. The profitability of the idea depends on being able to protect the
secret, typically by investing in a patent filing, successful prosecution of
the patent claims, and litigation resources for its defense against infring-
ing competitors.' 7 Larger businesses with sophisticated patent staffs can
defeat the innovator who errs along the way. Therefore, a chilling effect
exists for the smaller firm entering an area well staked by larger patent
holders. For the entrepreneur, exploitation of that commercial idea may
become financially unachievable if the rights to practice that invention
15 For example, the FDA has been given virtually unchecked authority to determine
when a drug innovator has met the "new drug" standards of effectiveness. See e.g.. Wein-
berger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 627 (1973).
16 For example, government can force disgorgement of profits at a level so large that a
company becomes unprofitable - a possible death sentence for firms that do not have diversi-
fied product lines. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Abbott Laboratories to
Remedy Deficiencies in Medical Diagnostic Devices and Pay $100 Million (Nov. 2, 1999),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/November/ 522civ.htm.
17 See generally I DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS (2000).
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are claimed by a larger firm and the would-be innovator finds that it must
pay license fees to the larger competitor.'
4. Technical Failure
Risks of technical failure and its adverse consequences, such as per-
sonal injuries and contractual damages, pose a fourth challenge to the
innovator. True innovations like novel drugs carry unforeseen conse-
quences that only emerge after market entry. 19 If the innovator's widget
breaks so easily that dozens of users bring products liability claims, the
entrepreneur's capital will be exhausted in defense of liability lawsuits or
suits for economic damages from the failure of the product. Small size
or lack of experience works against the defendant in a products liability
lawsuit.211 The social policy of protecting consumers by allocating the
risk of loss to the manufacturer 2 1 can override the desirability of encour-
aging innovative experimentation in complex technological products.
B. THE REGULATORY BARRIER
This article addresses a fifth barrier to the innovator: the demands
placed on an entrepreneur by the government regulatory agency acting
either as a gatekeeper (regulating pre-market product approval) or as a
policing agent (controlling design safety or manufacturing aspects of the
product after it has been approved for marketing). Government regula-
tory policies affect the innovator-entrepreneur's environment in several
ways; 22 this article examines the product approval context of regulation
in which the gatekeeper function is heavily dependent on clarity of com-
munication between the agency and the regulated product innovator.
Administrative agencies produce new rules and regulations, and en-
force existing rules in a uniform manner. This equivalence of treatment
among regulated parties benefits risk-averse population groups in soci-
ety, such as airline passengers who expect a uniformly high level of
safety regardless of the size of the vendor or aircraft manufacturer. Uni-
formity also carries a direct benefit to risk-averse agencies that fear being
judicially reversed should they selectively accommodate one regulated
18 Assuming that licenses can be negotiated, the price paid to practice the invention
under a license may eliminate the cost advantage that the innovative product offered over its
rivals.
19 This is the rationale for the products liability doctrine exempting new prescription
drugs from strict products liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. g (1998).
20 See generally JAMES O'REILLY, PRODUCT WARNINGS, DEFECTS & HAZARDS §1.01 (2d
ed. 1999) (discussing other challenges faced by defendants in products liability suits).
21 -See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. a (1998).
22 See Albert Bruno & Tyzoon Tyebjee, The Environment for Entrepreneurship, in EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 288, 296 (Calvin Kent, et. al eds., 1982) (discussing regu-
latory burdens of taxation on entrepreneurs).
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person's needs over another.23 For both reasons, agency managers strive
to keep interpretations of their agency's rules reasonably uniform within
the bounds of past agency precedents. 24
But both smaller entrepreneurs and larger, more established firms
know that one size does not fit all: flexibility and responsiveness to dif-
fering needs are very important to the success of the innovator-entrepre-
neur. For example, uniformly requiring all production to be in 1,000-unit.
lots would be unacceptable to the company that supplies ten custom
made units per month. In fact, regulatory hurdles that may be easy for
larger competitors to surmount can mark the end of the race for the
smaller innovator-entrepreneur. Larger, more established companies
may enjoy an enhanced ability to obtain requisite licensure, or. may se-
cure favorable regulatory treatment by virtue of a past relationship with
an administrative agency or the ability to dominate negotiated rulemak-
ing proceedings. As the negotiated rulemaking tool evolves, 25 examina-
tion of larger firms' advocacy for more stringent regulations 26 continues
to be a theme of the literature addressing the negotiation process, and the
wisdom of allowing larger firms to manipulate and control the rulemak-
ing process to the detriment of smaller concerns has been increasingly
called into question. 27
The last decade witnessed a popular backlash against regulatory
agencies' perceived inhibitions of new and possibly beneficial drugs,
medical devices, consumer safety devices, etc., and resulted in calls for
government to reduce barriers to innovation. 28 Despite some progress in
23 Agencies that set preconditions for market entry are particularly concerned with the
comparability of their standards across competing product types. See, e.g., Forester v. Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 559 F.2d 774, 792-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (divergent treatment of
two types of bicycle brakes held irrational).
24 Failure to do so can lead to years of litigation and saddle agencies with a major burden
when they alter their position on a controversial policy. See e.g., Securities & Exch. Comm'n
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (in which a change in securities regulation triggered
litigation that twice made its way to the Supreme Court over a five year period).
25 Negotiated rulemaking is a structured process for the development of federal agency
regulations through the convening of dialogue groups composed of the representatives of the
parties most interested in that rule.
26 For example, major makers of washing machines were criticized for their support of
energy regulations on appliance design, favoring a "big government rule because it allows
them to scrap a lower-priced item with a higher priced one." Kimberly Schuld, Call Off the
Laundr' Cops, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 21, 2000, at A I2.
27 Some commentators fear the negotiated rulemaking process might give regulated in-
dustries too much power over how they themselves are governed. See Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulator' Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206,
1216-17 (1994): see also William Funk, When Smoke Gets In Your Eves: Regulator' Negotia-
tion and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENvWL. L. 55, 57 (1987). But
see Henry Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Bere Federal Agencies, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625 (1986):
Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure Jor Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982).
28 AIDS drug advocates, in particular, were concerned that decisions on adequate proof
of pharmaceutical product effectiveness were inhibiting the marketing clearance of new medi-
[Vol. 10:63
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reducing or eliminating needlessly sophisticated regulations, in practical
terms, innovator-entrepreneurs continue to face a series of regulatory
barriers that increase in direct proportion to the social cost of the prod-
uct's risk and the relevant statute's regulatory complexity. A novel med-
ical device may be wonderful for the surgeon, but its maker must satisfy
complicated regulatory prerequisites before marketing can begin.2 9 The
more intricate the agency scheme of control, the more difficult it will be
for a smaller enterprise to master that complexity and deliver its project
to the marketplace. The mantra that the law must be uniform frustrates
those least equipped to comply with its terms. 3) For example, Boeing
builds jet aircraft and employs many persons to understand the require-
ments of federal aviation rules. A smaller aircraft builder could not ex-
pect to compete unless it had the expertise, personnel, and capital to
satisfy federal aviation requirements. 3' When the makers of a stick with
an electric cord sold it to fishermen as a worm probe intended to shock
worms, they did not anticipate complaints that human beings could also
be shocked; however, the CPSC challenged this simple product in a com-
plex federal court case. 32 Thus, complexity and difficulty of compliance
harbor the real potential to drive the smaller innovator-entrepreneurs out
of business.
C. REGULATORY REGIMES RESPOND CHIEFLY To LARGER FIRMS'
INTERESTS
All input in the regulatory policymaking context is not regarded
equally. Many federal rules are developed in pre-public discussion
stages involving representatives of interested groups or constituents who
cations. See Carolyn Lochhead, House Votes to Speed FDA Drug Approval, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
8, 1997, at A3. FDA responded with regulatory changes and ultimately Congress amended the
statute to encourage more rapid approval of drugs for special, critical needs. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 356 (Supp. IV 1998).
29 For example, an artificial jaw implant must continuously meet FDA standards for
safety and effectiveness or it can be recalled, banned or seized; a smaller company whose
medical device fails may face bankruptcy as well as regulatory problems. See In Re Temporo-
mandibular Joint Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1052-54 (8' Cir. 1996) (The FDA
ordered the removal of a jaw implant from the market when it was determined to cause harm
to patients. The manufacturer of the device went bankrupt.).
30 For an excellent analysis, see Paul Verkuil, The Regulator3 , Flexibility Act: A Critical
Analysis, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213, 221-23 (1982).
31 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 23 (2000) (discussing aviation parts standards).
32 See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. Dye, Consumer Product Safety Guide (CCH)
75,407 (D. Idaho Aug. 31, 1988). The ultimate low-tech product was intended to frighten
worms out of holes but the CPSC found it could cause electric shocks to humans. See id.
Though the company actually won its initial court battle, it lost the war; the CPSC later or-
dered the company to refrain from manufacturing its product after the company had declared
bankruptcy. Press Release, U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission, P&M Worm Probes
Found Hazardous: Electrocution Risk Cited in CPSC Order to Halt Manufacture and Sale of
Worm Probes (July 26, 1991), available at http://www.cpsc.gov.
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have captured the attention of a given regulatory agency. 33 Smaller en-
trepreneurs unable to "capture" the policy-making apparatus of an ad-
ministrative body are placed at a distinct disadvantage. Effective
participation in the rulemaking process necessitates actual attendance and
actual participation in such meetings at the agency's headquarters where
policies are determined. Yet, this type of participation is a rare luxury
for the smaller business owner. 34
Rulemaking by federal agencies must allow for public comments, 35
usually written objections or statements of support, concerning a pro-
posed rulemaking. The comment process is well understood by the more
sophisticated companies affected by new rules. Larger companies can
effectively foreclose opportunities for the innovator-entrepreneur by us-
ing their input at the rulemaking stage to encourage the agency to set the
norm for compliance at a uniformly high level of sophistication that dis-
advantages small enterprises. The well-informed interested larger busi-
nesses tend to adapt well to new rulemaking projects, seeking exceptions
and conditions that accommodate their needs through early input during
the rulemaking process. 36 The larger business lobbyist can interact early,
win seats on advisory councils, and later fill the rulemaking record with
support for a clause or exception that benefits its product. The aphorism
that the world is divided into "those that make things happen, those that
watch things happen, and those who wonder what happened" plays out in
every significant rulemaking dispute. Innovator-entrepreneurs tend to be
in the latter category because a lack of timely information access fre-
quently denies them access to the rulemaking process.
33 For example, OSHA, within the Department of Labor, uses its National Advisory
Commission as a source of comments on its ergonomic regulations. See http://www.dol.gov/
osha: see also E. Donald Elliott, Reinventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492-93 (1992),
quoted in PETER L. STRAUSS ET. AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 337 (9"
ed. 1995). Elliott suggests that agencies do not use the notice-and-comment process to obtain
public input when making a rule but rather rely upon other means such as "informal meetings
with trade associations and other constituteny groups." Id. The author writes, "Notice-and-
comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human pas-
sions-a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of something which
in real life takes place in other venues." Id.
34 See Weidenbaum, supra note 6, at 6. The article states:
It is the rare mid-size company that can afford to detach a member of its manage-
ment from day-to-day operations for the comparative luxury of attending an aca-
demic-like meeting. It is not surprising that, as a result of this neglect, the interests
of mid-size companies receive scant attention in the public policy process.
Id.
35 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994).
36 For example, according to the preamble of its final rule on ergonomics, OSHA worked
directly with big businesses to reach settlements for ergonomics compliance. See OSHA,




Comments on proposed rules37 submitted by members of the public
were once a valued source of input in the rulemaking process, and the
comment period still serves as one of the only opportunities for input
available to the smaller innovator-entrepreneur. However, the public's
comments have decreased in significance as rulemaking has increased in
complexity. The paper flow of the rulemaking comment process has be-
come so unmanageable that agencies have begun to avoid addressing
commentators' proposed alternatives. For example, some agencies con-
tract out the handling of comments, and then review only summaries of
the major issues raised. 38 Thus, the only method of participation in the
rulemaking process the innovator-entrepreneur is likely to have the re-
sources to exploit - the statutorily mandated comment period - is also the
method of participation least likely to impact the formulation of adminis-
trative rules.
Since innovator-entrepreneurs often lack the resources and en-
trenched agency relationships necessary to make a difference in shaping
administrative regulations, they may often remain uninformed of any
new regulations that might govern the development of their ideas until a
given rule is published in the Federal Register. Publication in the Fed-
eral Register is deemed legal notice to every person of the new rule's
requirements, 39 yet few entrepreneurs scour the Register looking for is-
sues that may affect their enterprises. The final rule on design, perform-
ance of a product, or process is likely to be comprehensive and precise,
but might also be beyond the budget of the smaller entrepreneur. 411
D. PROHIBITIVE COSTS OF COMPLIANCE WITH ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATIONS
Innovators are less able to amortize the high overhead costs of regu-
latory compliance across sales volume or over time, because they are
likely to lack the capital and personnel needed to satisfy uniform regula-
tory prerequisites for product manufacture and marketing.4' Absent the
37 For details of the comment process, see JAMES T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE
RULEMAKING, § 5.01 (1983 & 2000 Supp.)
38 The EPA has hired contractors to read incoming comments and produce summaries.
See EPA, Air and Radiation Docket and Information Center at http://www.epa.gov/airprogm/
oar/docket.htm (last modified Aug. 16, 1999) (indicating that contract personnel provide the
docket services for comments about air rules).
39 See Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1947).
40 For example, a critic of FDA radiology equipment rules claimed the rules freeze out
small manufacturers of those products by setting the standard for manufacturing plants so high.
Kenneth W. Chilton, Regulation and the Entrepreneurial Environment, in THE ENVIRONMENT
FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP 91, 99 (Calvin A. Kent ed., 1984).
41 For example, small companies lack the depth and extent of staff of the larger compa-
nies that routinely deal with FDA approvals, so their innovations are more often brought to
market by larger finns. See Zoltan J. Acs & David S. Evans, Entrepreneurship and Small
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ability to complete the complex regulatory paperwork needed to get the
product to market,42 the innovator often must sell the company to a
larger firm with the resources needed to secure product approval. Alter-
natively, the innovator might license away the technology underlying the
invention, accepting a licensing fee from a more highly capitalized phar-
maceutical or chemical maker who then goes on to develop and market
the product. 43 In short, large companies are able to crowd out innovator-
entrepreneurs in large part because smaller firms are simply unable to
comply with costly administrative regulations on their own. This market
concentration could be avoided if agencies promoted less complex and
expensive forms of compliance.
Even those innovators fortunate enough to remain alive through the
product approval process might eventually be bankrupted due to non-
compliance issues. For example, in 1999, a multinational firm that failed
to satisfy the FDA's complex manufacturing norms was forced to dis-
gorge $100 million of its profits and to undergo tight federal supervision
for at least four years. Should it fail to comply again in the future, addi-
tional penalties will be owed to the government.44
Thus the conundrum for the small entrepreneurial firm: innovation
often starts with a single energetic inventor who wants to bring a fresh,
new, and useful idea to market. But the regulated firms who dominate
some markets have ramped up the costs of participating in the regulatory
approval process, so that the innovator-entrepreneur cannot afford to
compete with larger firms in the race for product approval and distribu-
tion. As regulations grow more complex, control systems imposed by
federal agencies become even more substantial barriers. The quality sys-
tems regulations for medical devices, 45 new drug application require-
ments for pharmaceuticals, 46 and the aviation safety rules of the Federal
Aviation Administration 47 illustrate the problem of process standardiza-
tion set at a level of sophisticated compliance that is likely to exceed the
reach of the smaller entities. An economist has shown how "bureaucratic
drift" toward more complex and intensive regulation results in approval
delays, prohibitive costs, and increasingly intense data development re-
Business Growth: A Case Study', in 6 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNO-
VATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 3 at 143, 169-70.
42 See id. at 173 (small entities lack specialized personnel and cash flow to attain the
level of manufacturing sophistication demanded by regulatory norms).
43 As an expert witness in pharmaceutical cases, the author has observed that innovators
who lack the capability to surmount FDA approval barriers will usually license the product to
a firm with extensive product lines, and the new owner takes on responsibility for details of the
drug's compliance.
44 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 16.
45 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1-820.250) (2000).
46 See id. §§ 314.1-314.560 (2000).
47 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.1-21.621 (2000).
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quirements, while procedures and statutes limit any contrary drift toward
diminished burdens. 4
8
II. HOW AGENCIES HAVE RESPONDED TO THE NEED FOR
GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN REGULATING THE
INNOVATOR-ENTREPRENEUR
A. CARVING OUT EXEMPTIONS By SIZE OF THE ENTERPRISE
Of course, society wants and deserves to be protected from harmful
products. Legislation empowers various administrative agencies to en-
force protective norms so that society can be shielded from the potential
harms flowing from large and small sources alike. But the need for uni-
form protection does not imply that there is only one, uniform way to
provide it; the application of alternative compliance procedures for
smaller, innovative concerns could protect the public, while simultane-
ously stimulating creativity and improvements in the marketplace that
benefits society as a whole. Congress has responded to smaller business'
concerns about the burdens of regulation by creating a series of specific
exceptions to various normative regulations. For example, OSHA does
not routinely require injury and illness reports from facilities with fewer
than ten employees.4 9 The EPA does not impose its strict hazardous
waste rules upon those who generate only small quantities of waste.5 °
The Wage & Hour Division of the Department of Labor treats the small-
est employers differently on wages and overtime issues. 5'
Public controversy over these carve-out exceptions varies according
to the nature of the basic regulation. For example, an exclusion of a
business from the coverage of a health mandate or a safety prerequisite is
much more likely to be challenged than a purely economic exception,
because jeopardizing the health or safety of even one individual seems
unacceptable.5 2 Therefore, a normative view of uniform national safety
goals argues for rejection of a regulatory carve-out based on the size of
an enterprise. After all, the goal of social regulation is to prevent harm,
48 Mary K. Olson, Explaining Regulatory Behavior in the FDA: Political Control vs.
AgencY Discretion, in 7 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 71, 73 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 1996).
49 29 C.F.R. § 1914.15 (2000).
50 40 C.F.R. § 262.34 (2000).
51 See U.S. Department of Labor, Small Business Handbook, Wage, Hour and Other
Workplace Standards, available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/asp/public/programs /handbook/
minwage.htm (last updated Dec. 1999) (describing an exemption from wage and hour provi-
sions for firms with less than $500,000 in annual dollar volume of business); see also 29
C.F.R. § 516 (2000) (exempting certain types of employees in any size business from wage
and hour requirements).
52 For example, OSHA-has indicated that it "does not consider it to be appropriate to
determine the extent of protection afforded an employee by the size of the business he/she is
employed in." 29 C.F.R. § 1904.15 (2000).
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but carve-out rules seem to condone it by permitting more injuries to
occur than would be possible under a uniform system of full inspection
and enforcement. As to the safety of products prepared at the smaller
site, a carve-out would arguably have even less justification because the
consumer does not often know the employee size or status of the pro-
ducer (and therefore, when the carve-out exception applies). Conse-
quently, those who oppose carve-out exceptions may. argue that
consumer expectations of prophylactic government regulations are frus-
trated by undisclosed exceptions from regulatory safeguards.
A pragmatic argument in support of carve-out exemptions for
smaller innovator-entrepreneurs might assert that, given the limited re-
sources of administrative agencies, safety regulators should aim at the
targets where deterrence will produce the greatest quantity of public
health protection. 53 For example, since there are a limited number of
occupational safety inspectors available, their deployment to larger facto-
ries with greater risk potential seems appropriate, even though smaller
facilities pose risks as great as the larger factories in some instances. The
ultimate decision as to whether or not to permit carve-outs and under
what circumstances is a policy choice for Congress to make. As men-
tioned above, Congress has enacted legislation permitting regulatory
carve-out exemptions for smaller enterprises in certain contexts. 54
B. THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT
In another effort to recognize and correct for excessive regulatory
burdens placed on smaller innovator-entrepreneurs, Congress passed the
Regulatory Flexibility Act ("RFA") in 1980. 55 The purpose of RFA was
to impose an affirmative duty upon agencies to actively consider the
needs of smaller entrepreneurs when adopting new rules. The Act re-
quired agencies that adopted new rules to include statements detailing the
impact of the rule upon smaller entities and the agency's consideration of
practical means to reduce the adverse impacts.56
53 The selection of cases to be pursued under such a "triage" system may be left to
agency discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
54 See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
5- See 5 U.S.C. § 601-612 (1994).
56 Id. §603(b)(4)-(5), (c) (1994). The statute states that agencies must provide:
JAI description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance re-
quirements of the proposed rule, including an estimate of the classes of small entities
which will be subject to the requirement and the type of professional skills necessary
for preparation of the report or record; an identification, to the extent practicable, of
all relevant Federal rules which may duplicate, overlap or conflict with the proposed
rule; . . . a description of any significant alternatives to the proposed rule which
accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize any sig-
nificant economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities.
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RFA's potential for effectiveness is limited, in that it does not apply
retroactively to rules adopted prior to 1980. With no statutory require-
ment to look back at existing regulations, older rules remain in place
without substantial incentives for administrative scrutiny. Furthermore,
the Act's "extremely qualified and ambiguous provision for judicial re-
view" hinders enforcement of the few prospective requirements imposed
by RFA. 57 And even when agencies do follow the letter of the new law,.
arguably little is achieved. An agency satisfies RFA's minimal require-
ments when it verifies its compliance with the additional paperwork
specified under the Act. Agencies can simply announce that their staffs
have completed perfunctory analyses of a rule's effect on smaller entities
and found no disparate impacts. 58 The statute does not include a com-
mand to actually loosen requirements affecting smaller businesses when
rules are adopted,59 nor does it provide a judicial remedy for those ad-
versely affected by a new rule promulgated without sufficient flexibility
analysis. 611
Thus, RFA's attempt to ensure greater flexibility in the administra-
tive regulatory framework failed utterly to achieve its purpose. This in-
adequacy led smaller business organizations to lobby for enactment of
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
("SBREFA") 61, which amended RFA and required more detailed atten-
tion to the impact of agency rules upon smaller entities.
C. EFFECTS OF SBREFA
The adoption of SBREFA in 1996 created several potentially signif-
icant opportunities for the innovator-entrepreneur who must interact with
federal regulators. SBREFA encouraged federal agencies "to answer in-
quiries by small entities," 62 and directed federal agencies to assemble
and disseminate regulatory guidance. Specifically, the legislation re-
57 See Paul Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the RegulatorY Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J.
213, 259 (1982).
58 See 5 U.S.C. § 605 (1994).
19 See id. § 603 (the statute does not require modification to accommodate small busi-
ness objections).
60 See id.. § 605 (Supp. V 1999) (allowing agency heads to determine when flexibility
analysis is unnecessary).
61 See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBRFA), Pub. L.
No. 104-121, tit. I1, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
62 Id. § 213(a), 110 Stat. at 859. SBREFA requires agencies to establish programs for
responding to small entities' questions "utilizing existing functions and personnel of the
agency to the extent practicable." Id. § 213(b), 110 Stat. at 859. In a period of budget concern
for many agencies, this clause apparently represented a compromise intended to prevent agen-
cies from delaying their implementation of the Act's requirements pending a supplemental
appropriation of funds for the new function. Unfortunately, there is no definitive Senate or
House Report to illuminate the full legislative intent. See Pub. L. No. 104-121, 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 847) 606. A useful comment is found in Keith N. Cole, The Small
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quires agencies to create a simplified explanatory compliance guide
whenever the analysis requirement of the Regulatory Flexibility Act is
triggered for a rule or group of related rules.63 To ensure enforcement of
these provisions, advisory councils of the Small Business Administration
were established. 64 In addition, the Electronic Freedom of Information
Act ("EFOIA") Amendments of 199665 empower federal agencies to dis-
seminate their guidance documents and manuals via the Internet, 66
thereby further increasing the chances that agency guidance will ulti-
mately reach smaller innovator-entrepreneurs.
Significantly, SBREFA also contains a provision estopping an
agency from reneging on the advice provided to innovator-entrepreneurs,
and/or from prosecuting or penalizing the small entity that requests the
advice.67 Though no Senate or House reports accompanied the fast-track
legislation, the Republican Congress appears to have arm-wrestled the
Clinton Administration to arrive at politically acceptable terms for the
estoppel provision; the statute provides that guidance given to a small
entity by an agency "may be considered as evidence of the reasonable-
ness or appropriateness of any proposed fines, penalties or damages
sought against that small entity. '6 This compromised wording signals
Congressional refusal to give absolute immunity to small businesses re-
lying upon agency advice.
However, even in instances where estoppel does not apply,
SBREFA requires federal agencies to establish policies providing for the
partial waiver of normally applicable civil penalties "for violations of a
statutory or regulatory requirement by a small entity" 69 under certain
mitigating conditions, including a showing of a good faith effort to cor-
rect the problem and, possibly, voluntary participation in a compliance
assistance or audit program. 7t Agencies may not apply the reductions to
"serious health, safety or environmental threats," nor to small entities
that "have been subject to multiple enforcement actions by the
agency."' 7' For those who qualify, SBREFA presents a viable opportu-
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act and the Regulatorv Flexibility Act: Could a
Single Word Doom the New NAAQS?, II TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 281, 289-90 (1998).
63 SBREFA § 212(a), 110 Stat. at, 858.
64 § 222, 110 Stat. at 861.
65 See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-
231, §552(a)(2), I10 Stat. 3048, 3049 (1996).
66 See Memorandum for Heads of Departments and Agencies, available at http:/]
www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/99093.htm (September 3, 1999) (in which the Attorney Gen-
eral urges all agencies to disclose as much information as possible via electronic means).
67 See SBREFA §213(a), 110 Stat. at 859.
68 §213(a), I 10 Stat. at 859.
69 § 223(a), 110 Stat. at 862.
70 § 223(b)(1-6), 110 Stat. at 862.
71 § 223(b)(1-6), 110 Stat. at 862.
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nity to avoid potentially bankrupting civil penalties for regulatory non-
compliance. And there is some evidence that agencies have imple-
mented and publicized these statutorily required waiver policies. The
EPA, for example, has told Congress that it is "aggressively marketing"
its reduction program to smaller business.72
Finally, SBREFA helped to ensure greater accountability and adher-
ence to its statutory mandates by modifying RFA to include judicial re-
view provisions. In this manner, SBREFA attempted to cure agencies'
prior reluctance to engage in the good faith flexibility analysis required
under RFA. 73 SBREFA permits judicial review when an agency fails to
perform an adequate analysis of the effects of a proposed rule on small
business. However, the remedies are limited and do not include outright
rejection of the proposed rule. Rather, the court may remand the rule to
the agency for analysis and/or may enter an order "deferring the enforce-
ment of the rule against small entities unless the court finds that contin-
ued enforcement of the rule is in the public interest. '74 Thus, under
SBREFA, agencies are deterred from ignoring the small business analy-
sis requirements because, if they do so, their proposed rules might be
unenforceable against smaller businesses until the agency performs the
analysis.
The combination of the compliance guide and facilitated Intemet
access to policy manuals, guidance documents, and interpretations could
be very helpful for the smaller innovator-entrepreneur. Each source
makes the regulatory regime more transparent to those charged with
compliance-though none of these devices simplify the content or lessen
the potential impact of federal regulation upon the innovator -entrepre-
neur. However, while information may now be flowing more freely
from agencies than it once was, federal regulators could do more to ad-
dress the informational needs of entrepreneurial innovators.
III. RESPONSIVENESS MODELS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY - CREATING THE DUTY TO ASSIST
A futuristic model of regulatory agency interaction with innovative,
entrepreneurial businesses includes several additional vehicles for com-
munication. Some agencies already utilize websites to interact with con-
stituents, accept submissions of comments on proposed rules via e-mail,
72 EPA Rep. to Congress, The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
Section 223 Penalty Reduction Program for Small Entities, at § 4.0, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/990903.htm (March 1998).
73 See Cole, supra note 62, at 284-87 (discussing business and Congressional disappoint-
ment with EPA's failure to conduct regulatory flexibility analysis).
74 SBREFA § 242, 110 Stat. at 865.
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and offer compliance guides for regulated persons. 75 More agencies will
do so in the future and, by the end of the decade, there may also be broad
agency acceptance of these and other measures including:
-User-friendly agency websites
-Compliance guides for parties seeking to educate them-
selves about how to comply with regulatory commands 76
-Interactive web-based questions and answers on regula-
tory topics
*Downloadable self-audit guides
-Forms and instructions capable of being submitted on-
line
-"Artificial intelligence" tutorial programs that facilitate
responses to specific types of questions, using "if A then
B" logic tree approaches.
-Paperless "virtual inspection" of files maintained in a
standardized electronic format that might be prescribed
by agency rules
-Use of email and videoconferencing for pre-penalty dis-
covery and "virtual subpoenas" as tools for enforcement
-Continuous feedback opportunities for rulemaking sug-
gestions and concerns in place of paper comments
Cumulatively, these electronic media would help regulated persons
to train themselves about compliance, and the feedback obtained from
dialogue might help Washington-based regulators appreciate the com-
plexity of the distant business climates in which regulatory burdens actu-
ally impact affected persons.
The next logical step would be statutory enactment of a basis upon
which the education and interaction can take place. The specific format
most likely to help small business would be the creation of a duty upon
agencies to affirmatively assist smaller entities, coupled with legislative
permission for the entities to rely upon the guidance that these agencies
provide.
To be clear, educational interaction would not change the public law
character of federal rulemaking. No one expects that the Internet will
transform regulatory decision making into a totally open mass dialogue
like the classic New England Town meeting. 77 Rulemaking will con-
75 Agencies frequently update their websites and add improved search engines and logic
designs. See e.g., http://www.fda/gov (last modified Feb. 20, 2001); http://www.epa.gov (last
modified Feb. 2001), etc.
76 See Eugene Staley & Richard Morse, Developing Entrepreneurship: Elements for a
Program, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 357, 369 (Peter Kilby ed.
1971) (indicated that self-education tools are "invaluable to the small manufacturer").
77 Boston's famous Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once opined:
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tinue to be a public comment and response process for the entirety of the
constituencies affected. The proposed changes would involve tailoring
and clarifying, not altering, current regulatory requirements.
Despite the corrective measures imposed by SBREFA, RFA has not
proven effective in facilitating the innovator-entrepreneur's compliance
with newly promulgated administrative rules. While SBREFA does af-
ford small businesses an avenue for judicial review,78 there has not been
much occasion for litigation because many agencies no longer issue sub-
stantive regulations with any frequency, in light of the increased burdens
of administrative analyses of new rules. 79 The fact is that the great ma-
jority of a mature agency's work involves the continuing refinement of
policy through enforcement decisions and policy pronouncements, rather
than through promulgation of new rules. Therefore, RFA's pre-rulemak-
ing flexibility analysis is simply not enough to create a climate more
responsive to the limited resources of innovator-entrepreneurs.
A far better structural solution would be a requirement that federal
regulatory agencies actively converse with smaller entities about new
and existing regulations. Congress should impose a legal duty on federal
agencies to offer specific regulatory advice, binding upon the agency that
will help the smaller businessperson to comply. This could be accom-
plished through an amendment to RFA, or by amending the Administra-
tive Procedure Act notice process. 8t Congress took a small step in this
direction with the SBREFA guidelines, but much more could and should
be done.
The closest existing analogy to this proposed agency duty to assist
may be the Department of Veterans Affairs' ("DVA") statutory duty to
assist a veteran who applies for benefits. The DVA must help the vet-
eran seeking benefits in gathering evidence and provide counseling about
benefit criteria."' If the DVA denies a claim on the merits but substan-
The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an
assembly of the whole . . . (the people's) rights are protected in the only way that
they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those
who make the rule.
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
78 See supra text accompanying note 74.
79 Critics have observed that rulemaking has become "ossified" because of the growth of
such analysis requirements. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossif.,
Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995).
8() See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1994) (requires agencies to explain the reasons for denial of
applications or petitions).
81 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (1994). Traditionally, no attomeys were available to veterans so
Congress imposed special obligations of assistance upon the agency. See Walters v. Nat'l
Ass'n. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 30)5, 310 (1985), rev'd sub nom. Nat'l Ass'n of Radia-
tion Survivors v. Derwinski, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 30792 (9 h Cir. 1992) ("The board is
required by regulation 'to assist a claimant in developing the facts pertinent to his claim,' . ..
and to consider any evidence offered by the claimant.").
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tially fails to meet its duty to assist, then the claim is not deemed final
and the veteran can appeal further."' A less potent duty to assist arises in
social security disability hearings in which an administrative law judge
has an affirmative duty to develop the evidence in the adjudicative pro-
ceeding.8 3 Creation of a similar type of duty to assist the smaller innova-
tor-entrepreneur would significantly aid smaller business entrepreneurs
in understanding complex regulatory goals, standards, and norms, and
enable higher rates of compliance among those who want to comply with
agency regulations, but who need guidance in understanding the specifics
of a rule or requirement.
In addition, if smaller innovator-entrepreneurs could rely on inex-
pensively obtained agency advice, they would be better equipped to com-
pete with larger businesses. As discussed earlier, many federal agency
expectations are not transparent, and larger entities within the regulated
community have an advantage over their less wealthy competitors, in
that they can afford to hire well-connected Washington insiders to inter-
pret the agency intent behind a given rule. This imbalance cannot be
rectified by equalizing the disparities in affluence among regulated firms,
but the government can take steps to level the informational playing field
by providing reliable agency advice through the media of communication
that are most accessible to under-privileged innovator-entrepreneurs.
Requiring federal agencies to assist smaller entrepreneurs in their
regulatory compliance will help the innovator to deal with or avoid each
of the three basic categories of federal agency action: (1) rulemaking; (2)
adjudication; and (3) judicial enforcement. A statutory duty to assist
would enable greater participation in the entire process; with greater fa-
miliarity, the smaller innovative entity could be induced to supply its
unique perspective to the decision makers and could be expected to have
fewer court cases or penalty adjudications.
A. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO ASSIST MODEL
1. Qualified or Conditional Responses
This proposal of a statutory duty to assist is premised upon the as-
sumption that agencies will dispense accurate and helpful advice upon
request. However, one must recognize the nature of the source: agency
advice will, of course, consist of self-serving interpretations of statutes,
rules, and other norms. The business entity may inquire as to what rule
82 Hayre v. West, 188 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(d)(g); Bluvband v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 886, 895 (2d Cir 1984)
(holding that an administrative law judge failed in his duty to explore claimant's documented
history of emergency treatment); Williams v. Mathews, 427 F.Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(holding that the judge should have used its subpoena power under 42 U.S.C. § 405(d) to
obtain additional records from applicant's physician).
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applies, what the rule means, or what it means for an entity in its particu-
lar circumstances. While requiring the agency to give accurate and
timely answers to these questions will, no doubt, assist the entrepreneur
greatly, it is equally beyond doubt that agencies will include qualifiers
and limitations in their advisory opinions. Agencies are aware of the
weight that later observers could place on their advice, so the inherent
conservatism of the bureaucrat may lead to the use of qualifiers and
hedge words such as "the application is approvable for use of this drug
on minor cuts without extensive clinical studies; but of course the gen-
eral requirement for .such studies will apply if this or any other drug were
to be used for major skin abrasions or wounds."
2. Enforcement Thresholds
Furthermore, even in the face of a statutory duty to assist smaller
entrepreneurs, federal agencies are not likely to disclose or predict the
level of non-compliance they are willing to tolerate without initiating an
enforcement action. Revealing such thresholds for enforcement would
be counterintuitive, for it would encourage entities to set their compli-
ance at a level just shy of the point that would trigger an agency re-
sponse.84 Agencies generally only publish their thresholds for action
when total compliance is acknowledged to be impossible. For example,
the FDA adopted regulations delimiting quantitative tolerances for una-
voidable contaminants in foods such as dirt residues left on potatoes.8 5
More sophisticated and financially prosperous firms engage private
attorneys and regulatory experts, often former agency personnel, to pro-
vide invaluable advice as to what minimum level of compliance will be
tolerated by a given agency. This is an advantage that larger, more es-
tablished companies will inevitably continue to retain over their smaller
entrepreneurial competitors, even with the implementation of a statutory
duty to assist. For example, a statutory duty to assist a small food im-
porter would require the Customs Service to answer questions about cus-
toms regulations in a timely and reliable manner, but Customs officials
will not divulge the ektent to which the entrepreneur might fail to comply
with those regulations without risking an enforcement action. The larger
entity, however, will still be able to secure the services of a former Cus-
toms employee as an expediter or private consultant who can then advise
the company whether and to what extent the Customs Service will over-
look non-compliance in a given area. This type of leverage simply can-
84 Most agencies deny disclosure of their thresholds for enforcement when requested
under the Freedom of Information Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (1994) (authorizing agen-
cies to deny disclosure of information regarding investigative techniques and procedures of
enforcement where doing so "could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law").
85 See 21 C.F.R. § 109.3-109.4 (1999).
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not be eliminated as long as the advice and experience of former agency
personnel and insiders continues to be available to the highest bidder. It
would clearly be inappropriate to permit, much less require, current
agency personnel to inform smaller entrepreneurs of the agency's spe-
cific enforcement thresholds.
3. Self-Reporting and Immunities
The duty to assist model also cannot apply to self-reporting duties
that agencies demand from all licensees and regulated companies.8 6
Where the innovator-entrepreneur is required to self-report a problem
with its product, then requiring the agency to provide additional informa-
tion about product compliance becomes superfluous in certain situations
(i.e., someone who inquires whether to report a problem that they in fact
have an obligation to report will, of course, be told to report it.)
However, Congress must carefully consider what consequences
should most appropriately attach when an entity initiates an agency in-
quiry during which it inadvertently admits a self-reporting or other viola-
tion. In keeping with a current statutory trend at the state level, federal
duty to assist legislation should mandate an agency presumption in favor
of mitigating penalties by a large percentage where company disclosures
of violations are actual or voluntary, and not made during an audit or
inspection.8 7 Some feel that reduced penalties or grants of qualified im-
munity in exchange for voluntary disclosure of violations encourage fu-
ture self-correction of non-compliance, and avoid penalizing the
unsuspecting offender who wants to comply but whose failure to do so
stems from an honest lack of familiarity with the regulations. However,
several key federal agencies, including the EPA, vigorously oppose the
use of qualified immunity from penalties, regarding the practice as a dan-
gerous reduction in an agency's ability to enforce its authority. 88
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1994) (consumer products); see also 21 U.S.C. 360i(a)
(Supp. IV 1998) (medical devices).
87 See e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.72 (1999) (self-reported discovery of environ-
mental violations immune from liability if qualifying conditions are met). State statutes have
evolved from defense of audit contents to a defense of self-reports. ELIZABETH GLASS
GELTMAN, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS 212-214 (1997): James T.
O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges: The Need fr Legislative Recognition, 19 SETON
HALL LEGts. J. 119, 148-50 (1994) (discussing the EPA's successful defeat of a company's
attempts to claim self-audit immunity): Gerson H. Smoger, New Environmental Laws Muzzle
Critics, TRIAL, Oct. 1997, at 71-73 (discussing state statutory immunity against environmental
violations for companies that conduct self-audits).
88 See generally James Meason, Environmental Audits, Privileges.from Disclosure, and
Small Business Penalh Policies, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 497, 507 (1998).
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B. ESTOPPEL ELEMENT OF THE DUTY TO ASSIST
1. Why an estoppel provision is needed
A statutory duty to assist would be largely ineffective for innovator-
entrepreneurs without a concomitant legal right to rely upon the assis-
tance provided. Under the present system, administrative agencies may
successfully disclaim accountability for the advice they dispense, even
where a regulated individual detrimentally relies on the advice.8 9 Agen-
cies rarely empower their staff to give binding effect to an advisory opin-
ion9) nor are they compelled to do so. More commonly, perhaps in
response to the increasingly burdensome rulemaking procedures man-
dated by Congress,9' administrative agencies announce policy changes
through the adjudication process, 92 and are rarely estopped from doing
so. 9 3 Therefore, a statutory duty to assist innovator-entrepreneurs must
incorporate some form of limited estoppel to bind agency official's writ-
ten responses. For example, Congress could require that the agency des-
ignate a set of officials to sign the binding opinion letters.94 At the same
time, in deference to the fact that many agency responses necessarily
involve nuances of administrative policy not easily conveyed, the agency
must be permitted to prominently display on its website a disclaimer of
binding authority for other less authoritative manuals or policies, as well
as an indication of how the inquiring person can obtain a timely and
binding reply to other questions. Current models for binding opinions
89 Fed. Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 (1947) (the classic case of reliance
followed by disavowal).
90 See 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(g), (h) (2000).
91 See supra text accompanying note 56.
92 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 272 (1974). But cf Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 607 (1s" Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 1995 U.S.
LEXIS 1024. The case states that although
it is well established that agencies are free to announce and develop rules in an
adjudicatory setting . . . of course, there are limits on this freedom. As a general
matter, when an adjudicating agency retroactively applies a new legal standard that
significantly alters the rules of the game, the agency is obliged to give litigants
proper notice and a meaningful opportunity to adjust.
Id.; see also SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1947).
93 See Schweiker v. Hanson, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981); Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d 839,
842 ( " Cir. 1982). The Akbarin states:
The traditional doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply fully in cases of estop-
pel against the Government. For the Government to be estopped, it is necessary not
only that a party have relied on the Government's conduct - the basis of the tradi-
tional doctrine - but also that the Government have engaged in "affirmative miscon-
duct"... even when affirmative misconduct and reasonable reliance occur, however,
it is not clear that the Government should be estopped.
Id.; see also U.S. v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 704 (7" Cir. 1978) (indicating that government
action should only be estopped where there are "compelling reasons to do so").
94 This could be, for example, the chief enforcer or chief lawyer of the agency.
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include antitrust opinions issued by the U.S. Department of Justice.95
Even non-binding agency pronouncements may have utility to some reg-
ulated firms but in order to obtain optimal benefit for the entrepreneur;
there must be a form of administrative agency estoppel that prevents a
reversal of position after responses to specific inquiries are given.
2. Limiting use of estoppel to smaller innovator-entrepreneurs
only
Of course the limits of the estoppel feature must be defined clearly
and restrictively so as to eliminate any potential for abuse. A duty to
assist statute must categorize those entitled to the duty to assist, so that
binding agency guidance would only become available to smaller inno-
vator-entrepreneurs. Without this restriction, larger firms would be able
to take advantage of the service's estoppel benefit and delay an agency's
ability to respond to genuine requests by clogging the system with sham
inquiries. Limiting access to agency information for some parties while
making it available to others is not unprecedented. 96 Nor is restricting
estoppel to smaller concerns unfair in this instance, since larger entities
normally rely upon consultants or intermediaries to meet their regulatory
advisory needs, and thus do not require the protection offered by the duty
to assist estoppel provisions. The statute should not provide yet another
advantage to larger firms that can already afford to pay for expert advice
by granting them a binding confirmation of the accuracy of that advice as
well. In keeping with its aim of equalizing information flow, the duty to
assist statute should properly benefit only those who presently cannot
afford independent and reliable regulatory compliance advice.
3. Limiting even the innovator-entrepreneur's use of estoppel
Neither should the smaller entrepreneur be able to abuse the advan-
tages of the estoppel provision. When using the duty to assist system,
the questioner must act prudently and provide all information the agency
might require to render accurate advice. Fraudulent concealment of
predicate facts should void the binding effect of the agency's advice,
since agency response must be conditioned upon assessment of the facts
as presented by the inquirer. Likewise, should the agency become aware
that the facts underpinning its prior advice no longer apply, the agency
must be able to provide notice that it will no longer be bound by that past
advice. Prudent agencies might incorporate into their advice letters both
95 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1999).
96 For example, pesticide data cannot be examined by employees or agents of multina-
tional companies. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(g) (1994). In addition, the Freedom of Information Act
requires persons seeking free services to identify their role as scholars or journalists as a pre-
requisite to fee waiver. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(il) (1994).
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the material facts of the inquiry and a standard clause of disengagement,
so that the small entity will be placed on notice of the agency's under-
standing of the basis for the advice and the possibility of its retraction in
the event of changed circumstances. Such actual notice of the agency's
policy provided to a specific regulated entity should foreclose that entity
from later arguing that the advice is invalid due to the agency's failure to
publish or index its policy as required under the Freedom of Information
Act. 97 However, those who fail to comply with the advice provided by
the agency should be subject to normal enforcement procedures, as
would any other non-compliant party, because any perception that agen-
cies might target for investigation those who seek help would likely dis-
suade entrepreneurs from using the duty to assist program.
4. Limiting the estoppel period
The statutory estoppel clause should also be limited as to time and
effect so that smaller entities can legally rely on a given agency opinion
for no longer than eighteen months. Since administrative policies must,
by their nature, evolve over time and adapt to changing circumstances
and issues, it would be improper to bind an agency permanently to ad-
vice provided under the program. Providing a prospective expiration
date for the duty to assist advice within the body of the legislation itself
will prove more predictable for the users and simpler for the agencies to
manage than an ad hoc system of withdrawing advice if and when it
becomes necessary for the agency to do so. All advice provided under
the duty to assist regime could be archived and electronically flagged to
indicate when a letter has passed its statutory estoppel period. Of course,
even expired advice might still be a sound reflection of a continuing
agency policy. However, the smaller entity seeking to extend its legal
reliance upon that advice would have to submit another request for the
same opinion, or perhaps request a re-certification of the advice in order
to protect its estoppel rights.
In addition, entrepreneurs must be permitted to invoke the estoppel
defense only during agency enforcement proceedings. Even reliance
upon a valid agency opinion should not justify an estoppel defense in a
criminal proceeding. Federal prosecutors are reluctant to exempt indi-
viduals from criminal prosecution simply because they may have legiti-
mately acted with what they thought to be the informal authority of a
government agency. For example, a mail fraud prosecution under federal
criminal law98 could proceed against a food marketer whose claims in-
duce Internet purchasing of health foods, even if the company's claims
97 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2).
98 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
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complied with the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") standards, 99 be-
cause the Department of Justice and the FTC have separate channels for
identical conduct. Given this societal distaste for excusing criminal be-
havior, any estoppel provision attaching to the duty to assist must be
limited to enforcement proceedings at the agency level. However, the
criminal standard of requiring proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" should
mitigate any unfairness toward the criminal defendant who innocently
relies upon agency advice.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE DUTY TO ASSIST
A. THE INTERNET MODEL
The abundance of regulatory infonnation now available through the
Internet is enormous and encouraging. Certainly, to the extent that the
problem is lack of information, the cure is more access. However, effi-
cient delivery of information is useless if those who receive it are incapa-
ble of processing it appropriately. The innovative entrepreneurial firm
needs more than mere access to regulatory requirements. it needs gui-
dance and direction on which requirements are applicable to it and which
are not, which requirements are triggered by which circumstances, etc.
Entrepreneurs with innovative ideas vary widely in education, sophistica-
tion, and available time to spend on understanding nuances of the regula-
tory issue(s) confronting them. The Internet cannot process and correct
for these differences. This can only be accomplished through an interac-
tive dialogue rather than a "data dump."
A duty to assist approach combines all of the advantages of the In-
ternet's informational capabilities while eliminating its disadvantages.
An entity entitled to receive assistance could be coached by an intelligent
interactive website to find the particular documentary resources, forms,
or advice it required. When information failed to surface via the website,
users could send email requests for targeted answers to fact-specific
questions, which could in turn be processed by an actual correspondent
within the agency.
B. OMBUDSMAN MODEL
Traditionally, ombudsmen have served as complaint investigators
assisting aggrieved citizens in reaching amicable settlement of dis-
putes. " ' At least one agency"" has adapted this concept to create an
99 Federal Trade Commission, Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/guides/htm (May, 1994).
lo) WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (Victoria Neufeldt ed., 3d college ed. 1988.)
tol Other agencies with small ombudsman offices include the CPSC. See Consumer
Products Safety Commission, Small Business Ombudsman, available at http://www.cpsc/gov/
businfo/ombud.html (last updated Feb. 21, 2001).
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"interactive ombudsman" who serves as a regulatory coach of sorts, of-
fering affirmative training for successful compliance with agency regula-
tions and standards. The EPA's website explains the mixed roles of its
Small Business Ombudsmen program in depth."12 The EPA staffs its
office with engineers and economists, and much of their work focuses on
particular problem calls with some attention paid to input concerning
particular proposals. The expense of providing such tailored services
may be prohibitive for some agencies and non-problematic for others; on
balance, this article's alternative suggestion for reaching more constitu-
ents through Internet information services would be a more efficient
choice.
C. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL
Another model involves the use of an "e-mail advisor," an artificial
intelligence program, resident inside the agency's website. Artificial in-
telligence refers to a software program that processes pre-loaded sets of
decisional factors and provides pre-programmed responses according to
the inputs selected by the user. An agency could provide this service on
its website. Where the programmed questions and responses failed to
yield the information the user seeks, an agency staff person would then
respond to the question via email in a form that shielded the particular
inquirer's identity. Confidentiality would be of particular concern with
inquiries made to such agencies as the Internal Revenue Service and Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, since serious economic and/or crimi-
nal liability could attach to the inquiring party. For this reason, any
statute designed to implement such an "email advisor" plan should in-
clude an exemption to the normal requirements of public accessibility of
agency records tinder the Freedom of Information Act. '3
D. DIMINISHED COMPLEXITY OF COMPLIANCE STANDARDS
Alternatively, federal agencies could experiment with new, less
complex, regulatory methods and procedures that facilitate compliance
by the unsophisticated innovator-entrepreneur. Some agencies are al-
ready exploring this concept. For example, the Securities & Exchange
Commission ("SEC") has begun to permit Internet solicitation of inves-
tors in smaller enterprises."1 4 Under the SEC's program, investors in
102 EPA, EPA Small Business Ombudsman's (SBO) Homepage, at http://www.epa.gov/
sbo (last modified Jan. 29, 2001).
103 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994) (Supp. V 1999) (describing normal accessibility require-
ments): see, e.g., id. § 552(b)(3)(B) (1994) (providing for exemptions to public access require-
ments when mandated by other statutes).
104 See Daniel Giddings, An Innovative Link Between the Internet, the Capital Markets,
and the SEC: How the Internet Direct Public Offering Helps Small Companies Looking to
Raise Capital, 25 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 785, 789 (1998).
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smaller enterprises can be given required information with less
paperwork. In another program, dry cleaners and other smaller genera-
tors of hazardous waste can claim exemptions from EPA rules governing
the handling of larger quantities of hazardous wastes.11 5 But sometimes
agencies override objections of smaller firms and demand uniform com-
pliance without exception.0 6
V. ANTICIPATED CRITICISM OF A DUTY TO ASSIST
A. COSTS
A statutory duty to assist will require increases in federal agency
funding, personnel, equipment and staff workload. Such a progressive
and expensive program is not assured the support of the small business
innovator-entrepreneurs it is designed to help, because both small busi-
ness entrepreneurs and larger firms generally dislike bureaucracy, "big
government," and high taxes."1 7 No doubt some entrepreneurs and some
congressional appropriators will agree when the larger firms paint the
duty to assist model as a wasteful addition to the taxpayers' already con-
siderable burden.
The agencies themselves may also resist the idea of a statutory duty
to assist on cost grounds. To the extent that Congress may be reluctant
to authorize additional appropriations to implement a duty to assist pro-
gram, there may be internal agency staff opposition to reallocating en-
forcement funding toward support of advice programs. However, at the
same time, once smaller entities begin to use agency advice as a basis for
estoppel in enforcement proceedings, the agencies will likely require
more funding to maintain effectiveness in their enforcement divisions.
Without this additional funding, agencies may be encouraged to devise
rules that restrict the efficacy of the duty to assist program in an enforce-
ment proceeding." 8 Agencies might also attempt to pass on the higher
costs to the regulated community. Experience with the EPA's hazardous
waste program suggests that penalties increase as rules rigidify, because
105 40 C.F.R. §261.5 (2000). Congress specifically required EPA to examine the feasibil-
ity of such an exemption in the 1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation & Recovery
Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 98-198, at 103, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.A.A.N. 5636, 5674.
106 See e.g., Food Labeling: Warning and Notice Statement; Labeling of Juice Products,
63 Fed. Reg. 37030, 37053 (July 8, 1998) (overriding the objections of farmers with roadside
apple juice stands to processing and labeling requirements).
107 Kathleen Bawn, Political Decisions About Bureaucratic Accountability: Interests, In-
stitutions, and Prospects fir Reform, in 7 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH supra note 48, at 37, 37 ("Nobody likes bureaucracy.").
IO8 For example, although DVA has a duty to assist the veteran in preparing a claim for
benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a), in 1999, the agency promulgated a rule that prevents




the procedural formalities of the rulemaking process lessen the flexibility
of the enforcement program." 9 Perhaps a lessening of the flexibility in
the advice-giving function will have a similar effect.
Although all good ideas carry initial implementation costs, those
initial outlays pay dividends later. For example, the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act ("FOIA") amendments of 1974,' 11 which added a time-sensi-
tive response requirement to requests for information under the Act,
carried a large startup cost, and were criticized as a drain on other agency
programs.'' Yet FOIA has provided considerable benefits to society in
terms of holding the federal government accountable for its actions.
Likewise, the cost of a qualitatively expanded agency communication
effort such as a duty to assist is directly related to its value in increasing
compliance with agency regulations. Administrative regulations exist to
reduce social costs of pollution, injuries, illness, etc. Increased compli-
ance with the agencies' expected norms of performance will reduce the
negative effects of noncompliance on the community. Another benefit of
the duty to assist model is the opportunity it affords regulators to send a
positive, persuasive signal to the regulated community about the
agency's sincere desire to encourage compliance and decrease the busi-
ness constituency's negative perception of their role. The EPA Small
Business Ombudsman website, for example, is an excellent counterpoint
to that agency's legendary enforcement reputation.' 12 Thus, the costs of
implementing worthwhile programs diminish considerably when
weighed against the long-term benefits they generate.
In addition, critics should keep in mind that many of the costs asso-
ciated with the duty to assist model are already incurred by administra-
tive agencies in diverse ways; local offices and ombudsmen of federal
agencies already answer small businesspersons' telephonic and written
requests for information. Where the duty to assist model differs is in its
creation of a statutory duty to provide an Internet response to the inquir-
ing person upon which the entrepreneur can rely in managing the bureau-
cratic norms applicable to the enterprise.
Agency costs could be further reduced by several applications of
available technology, such as downloadable tutorial training programs.
Artificial intelligence software programs could be employed with tai-
lored messages responding to frequently asked questions. Adapting this
14)9 James T. Hamilton, Going by the (Informal) Book: The EPA's Use of Infrmal Rules
in Enfrcing Hazardous Waste Laws, in 7 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH supra note 48, at 109, 151.
lt See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994).
I The 1966 Act and the 1974 amendments met with some initial resistance within fed-
eral agencies. See I JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 2.03 (2d ed.
1990).
112 See EPA, supra note 102.
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commercially available software for familiar inquiries would reduce the
cost per response. Later inquirers could be guided to search keywords in
the electronic database of searchable answers, reducing the number of
repetitive questions on the same topic.
Finally, the agencies' costs might be reduced through additional
Congressional appropriations. The agencies that make visible efforts to
serve their constituencies by earnestly implementing the duty to assist
model are more likely to receive additional funding for the program once
Congress begins to hear from its constituents that the program is working
and is helpful. Appropriations subcommittee members hear from their
small business constituents frequently and make budget recommenda-
tions accordingly.
There is no question that, however justifiably, the imposition of a
new statutory duty to render useful and reliable advice would impose a
substantial administrative cost upon agencies. In a sense, taxpayers
would be doubly burdened, paying once to support the inspection and
enforcement functions of the agency and yet again for the expansive
counseling role a duty to assist would force agencies to assume. Does
the expenditure of such funds on a business advisory function externalize
what should be internalized costs of doing business? Will the funding
produce the net social benefit discussed above? Or will some innovator-
entrepreneurs continue to take regulatory risks regardless of whether they
have ready access to agency advice? Reasonable minds might differ
over the answers to these questions and come to varying conclusions as
to whether the cost of the duty to assist is justified by the types of possi-
ble benefits outlined above.
B. DOES OFFERING ADVICE MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE?
It is impossible to offer a blanket guarantee that a statutory duty to
assist will improve the problematic state of relations between smaller
innovator-entrepreneurs and federal administrative agencies. However,
data on consumer satisfaction about the utility of such a function could
be gathered both before and after the duty to assist model is initiated. If
the agencies' new duty to provide advice is well publicized, yet draws
minimal utilization, or if entrepreneurs who receive advice tell surveyors
that it does not influence their actions, then the project may fail and be
phased out.
Even if the project is successful, at least some innovator-entrepre-
neurs would likely continue either to take uninformed risks, or pay mar-
ketplace rates for the expert advice of consultants or attorneys, rather
than rely upon agency advice. Further, assessing the success of a duty to
assist initiative among those who chose to use it might be a difficult task;
data demonstrating a tangible benefit would require proof of why some
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potential violation did not happen, and it is hard to prove a negative
regarding conduct that is subject to complex causation.
For purposes of this analysis, we assume that at least a small portion
of regulated innovator-entrepreneurs would take advantage of regulatory
advice provided by administrative agencies under a statutory "duty to
assist." Entrepreneurs who must obtain specific product or service ap-
proval would be particularly likely to use the advice option because their
interactions with the agency are inevitable. With time and experience,
the advice function component of the duty to assist could be adapted
within each of the various agencies to produce one or more successful
models. No one assumes this will be painless for bureaucrats or entre-
preneurs. Mutual distrust developed over decades will inhibit acceptance
of the new models proposed herein. But the models can be made to
adapt to the particular setting of the several agencies' constituencies.
Congress should provide a framework of legal authority and allow the
agencies to find the methods that work best in their individual contexts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Entrepreneurial innovators developing products or services today
are caught in a regulatory catch-22: they can remain invisible below the
federal agency's enforcement "radar" and guess at what the agency's
norms might be, or they can become visible to the agency by risking an
inquiry and await agency guidance in response, thus risking an enforce-
ment challenge. A more optimal regulatory regime would involve ad-
vice, feedback, and greater dialogue such as the statutory duty to assist
proposed in this article.
More effective use of the Internet would meet the smaller entrepre-
neur's advisory needs and possibly foster better relations with regulators
through the establishment of a two-way dialogue. Congress should build
upon SBREFA by appropriating funds for an Internet-based, responsive,
interactive communications process to which smaller businesses can link
and obtain regulatory advice from each federal agency. A pilot program
in two or three agencies should demonstrate the efficacy of this method
of constituency interaction.
The changes this article proposes would have significant social ben-
efits. Well-informed compliance of smaller businesses reduces aliena-
tion and resentment of government's role in the economy. Enhanced
voluntary compliance with regulations saves dollars that would otherwise
have to be spent on cumbersome enforcement proceedings. And clearer
regulations enable regulated companies to avoid costs of re-working
projects or re-labeling products that would otherwise be passed on to
consumers.
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In the age of technology and information, there is no excuse for
allowing regulatory complexity to go unexplained. Congress should rec-
ognize its responsibility for providing clear and reliable agency advice.
The agencies should begin offering the duty to assist service, and the
Congress should follow with the modification of estoppel policies
through statutory reform. Together, Congress and the enlightened agen-
cies should embrace the learning tools of the twenty-first century and
employ them to promote compliance with the regulatory objectives of the
federal government.
